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1 Introduction
In many online systems, individuals provide services to one another. Napster
– now defunct – in which individuals shared music files is surely the most
familiar of the systems, but there are many systems and services in cur-
rent operation. In peer-to-peer networks, individuals share files (Gnutella
and Kazaa), or provide computational assistance (Seti@home) or provide
content, evaluations and answers to questions (Slashdot, Yahoo Answers).
More broadly, many entities (although not necessarily individuals) provide
forwarding/routing services to others. In such systems, the recipient of the
service obtains a benefit while the provider of the service incurs a cost,
which may be quite substantial. Assuming that the benefit exceeds the
cost, provision of the service increases social welfare and should therefore
be encouraged, but the agents (individuals or entities) providing the service
have an incentive to free ride. Empirical studies show that this free-riding
problem can be quite severe: in the Gnutella system for instance, almost
70% of users share no files at all (Adar & Hubeman, 2000).
In such settings, there is a great deal of scope for a benevolent designer to
improve welfare by careful design of a system that encourages exchange. The
extent to which this potential can be realized depends on the environment
in which the system operates and on the degree of control the designer can
exert. Here we show that a great deal can be achieved by implementing
a very simple and practicable system that relies solely on the exchange
of intrinsically worthless tokens or fiat money.1 We provide estimates for
efficiency and an effective procedure for constructing a “good” system. If
agents are patient or the benefit/cost ratio is high, efficiency can be made
near 1; i.e., trade will take place in almost all interactions.
Our work has a good deal in common with the literature on exchange in
the absence of a “double coincidence of wants” and on “money as a medium
of exchange”, of which Ostroy & Starr (1971) and Kiyotaki & Wright (1989)
are the seminal papers (see also especially Green & Zhou (1998) and Zhou
(1999)), but differs from that literature in important ways. To understand
our work and its relationship to that literature, it is useful to begin by
1By “tokens” or “fiat money” we mean the same thing; we use the former term to be
consistent with the engineering literature.
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identifying important features of our environment that are common to all
the systems mentioned above, and to understand the special restrictions
these features impose. The first is that agents interact directly, rather than
through a central authority.2 No central authority means no central record-
ing of transactions and of course no centralized punishments. The second
is that the scale is large and interactions are anonymous, so that although
agents may interact frequently, they do not interact repeatedly with the
same agents, so that reciprocation must be indirect, rather than direct. The
third is that, because individuals interact only online, they cannot observe
much information about the others with whom they interact; in particular
they cannot observe the histories of others. The fourth is that communica-
tion in our environment is typically costly (either in direct costs or in terms
of delay) or impossible.
The features identified above lead to the first desideratum for our sys-
tem: it should be completely distributed , in the sense that the behavior of
an agent – in particular, the decision to request/provide service – should
depend only on the agents’ own history. The second desideratum is that the
system be practicable. At the level of agents, practicability entails minimal
exchange of messages. At the level of the designer, practicability entails that
the designer initializes the system (in our work this means choosing a pro-
tocol : providing tokens and recommending strategies), but thereafter takes
no actions; in particular, the designer does not monitor the agents or the
system (and so cannot limit the number of tokens an agent can hold). Be-
cause it seems impossible for the designer to know the precise parameters of
the environment (in our setting this means benefit/cost ratios and discount
factors), practicability entails that the system should be robust to small per-
turbations of these parameters. Finally, practicability entails simplicity. We
admit that we cannot provide a working definition of “simplicity” but we
hope the results and discussion that follow will make the meaning clearer.
2Napster and the other systems mentioned above, and many others, do not operate
through a central authority. Napster, for instance, merely maintained many partial lists
(distributed across many servers) of music files available and contact information for sub-
scribers who had these files; users seeking files could simply search these lists and then
contact the file-holder directly. For such systems, the absence of a central authority is
necessary – a central authority could not handle the amount of traffic generated – and
desirable – because a central authority would be vulnerable to attacks that might crash
the entire system.
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These features and desiderata have implications for what is possible in
the environments we consider and what distinguishes our work from the lit-
erature. If there were a central authority that could record all encounter,
then deviations from recommended strategies could be easily detected and
punished, but as we have noted above, in our environment there is no cen-
tral authority or central record-keeping. The fact that agents do not meet
in person means that agents cannot inspect the token holdings of others.3
This makes it impossible to use procedures such as those required in the
“two-money theorem” of Kocherlakota (2002), which yields socially optimal
outcomes, and in Berensten, Camera & Waller (2007), and other papers, in
which the behavior of parties in a match requires that each party knows the
holding of the counter-party . It also seems impossible to use procedures that
require the parties to bargain because bargaining would require either that
each party knows the holding (hence the outside option) of the counter-party
or that the parties bargain without knowing the holding (hence the outside
option) of the counter-party, which (because it would take place in a setting
of incomplete information) would require a great deal of communication.
As we show in Theorem 5, our desire that the design be robust rules out
mixed strategies; similar arguments (discussed in the Conclusion) show that
robustness also rules out random or fractional offers. Because packets are
essentially indivisible, our environment rules out fractional exchanges, but
they would be ruled out by robustness as well. Perhaps more subtly, the
impossibility for the designer to monitor the holdings of agents rules out an
exogenous upper bound on the number of tokens an agent can hold; contrast
Camera & Corbae (1999), Berentsen (2000) and others.4 As we discuss in
Section 3, the absence of an exogenous upper bound on token holdings causes
surprising complications (proving that equilibrium exists becomes a difficult
task) and surprising implications (the “optimal quantity of money” may be
3The reader might wonder how agents who do not meet in person can exchange tokens
at all, since they can only exchange electronic files, and electronic files would seem to be
easily duplicated. In fact, however, there are practicable, secure and private procedures
for online token exchange, utilizing hardware or software or both; see Buttyan & Hubaux
(2001), Vishnumurthy & Chandrakumar & Sirer (2003) and Ciuffoletti (2010). Similar
procedures can also serve as escrow accounts to assure that service that is promised is
actually provided and that payment that is promised is actually made.
4In a somewhat different vein, Cavalcanti & Wallace (1999A, 1999B) study environ-
ments in which some agents (banks) can be monitored and can issue tokens.
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quite different than it is when an exogenous upper bound is imposed).
In the environment we consider, a continuum of agents each of whom
possesses a unique file that can be duplicated and provided to others. (In
the real systems we have in mind, the population is in the tens of thousands
or hundreds of thousands, so a continuum model seems a reasonable ap-
proximation.) In each period, a fraction of the population is matched; one
member of each match (the client) must decide whether to request service
(provision of a file or forwarding of a packet) and the other (the server)
must decide whether to provide the service (if requested). The client who
receives the service derives a benefit, the server who provides the service
incurs a cost. To simplify the analysis we assume here that, except for the
uniqueness of the files they possess, all agents are identical, and that all files
are equally valuable to receive and equally costly to provide. (We discuss
extensions in the Conclusion.) We assume the benefit exceeds the cost, so
that social welfare is increased when the service is provided, but that the
cost is strictly positive, so that the server has a disincentive to provide it.
We allow the designer to determine a supply of tokens and to recom-
mend strategies (circumstances under which service should be requested or
provided); together the token supply and the recommended strategies con-
stitute a protocol . We assume that the price of service is fixed at one token;
as we have noted above and discuss further in the Conclusion, robustness
rules out fractional and random offers. We require that the protocol should
induce an equilibrium – the recommended strategies are best replies in the
(unique) steady-state distribution – and remain so for small perturbations
of the population parameters. There are always degenerate equilibrium pro-
tocols in which no service is provided in the steady state. Aside from these
degenerate protocols, we show that the requirements of equilibrium and
of robustness has strong implications: all robust equilibrium protocols are
Markov in private token holdings (not history dependent) and symmetric
(the population plays a pure strategy) and have a particularly simple form:
clients request service whenever their token holding is above zero; servers
provide service when their token holding is below a certain threshold and
do not provide service when the token holding is above that threshold.5
5The fact that the designer recommends the same strategy to all agents is, in part, a
consequence of our assumption that agents are identical. If agents were of several types
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However, these conclusions do not entirely solve the designer’s prob-
lem, because he must choose the right threshold and the right supply of
tokens/money. If the threshold is too large, agents will not be willing to
continue providing service and accumulating tokens up to the threshold; if
the threshold is too small, agents will not be willing to stop providing ser-
vice and accumulating tokens when they reach the threshold; both of these
violate the equilibrium incentive conditions. If the supply of tokens is too
small many agents will have no tokens and hence will be unable to pur-
chase service; if the supply of tokens is too large, many agents will be at
the threshold and hence will be unwilling to provide service; both of these
degrade social welfare. Among all protocols with threshold K, there is a
unique protocol, in which the supply of tokens is K/2, that would be best if
agents always complied with the protocol – but this protocol need not be an
equilibrium. Given the parameters of the population (benefit/cost ratio and
discount factor) there is always at least one threshold – and at most two –
for which this protocol is a robust equilibrium; and we provide estimates for
the parameter ranges for which a particular protocol of this form is a robust
equilibrium and of the efficiency of such robust equilibrium protocols. A
consequence of these estimates is that, as the discount factor tends to 1 or
the benefit/cost ratio tends to ∞, the efficiency of such equilibrium proto-
cols becomes arbitrarily close to first-best (trade always occurs). However,
these protocols are not always the optimal equilibrium protocols: it may be
more efficient for the designer to choose a higher threshold but to supply
fewer tokens. In macro-economic language: K/2 need not be the optimal
quantity of money .
At the risk of redundancy, we would like to emphasize that the environ-
ment we study and the questions we ask are different from those in “‘stan-
dard” monetary theory, and that the differences present new challenges, to
which this paper responds. We believe this paper generates a number of
insights; among these are:
• the existence of equilibrium protocols is a delicate problem, but all
– differing perhaps in the types of files they provide, their costs, the benefits they derive
from various types of files, and even the frequency with which they request/provide service
– the designer would recommend the same strategy to all agents of a particular type, and
equilibrium would again be symmetric.
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equilibrium protocols are quite simple;
• the requirement that the system be practicable, and in particular that
equilibrium protocols be robust to small perturbations in the popula-
tion parameters, has significant impact on the nature of equilibrium;
• the most efficient robust equilibrium protocols do not necessarily pro-
vide half as many tokens as the selling threshold;
• in order that efficiency close to 1 be achievable, it is necessary that
either the benefit/cost ratio or the discount factor be high and that
both the threshold and the supply of tokens be large;
• efficiency can be attained in the limit when the benefit/cost ratio tends
to ∞ or the discount factor tends to 1
• explicit lower bounds on efficiency can be provided when the bene-
fit/cost ratio is finite and the discount factor is not close to 1;
• there is an effective procedure for constructing ‘good’ robust equilib-
rium protocols.
Following a further discussion of the literature below, the remainder of
the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 introduces the model,
defines strategies, the steady state value function, best responses, equilib-
rium and robust equilibrium. Section 3 describes the nature of equilibrium
and robust equilibrium. Section 4 discusses existence of robust equilib-
rium. Section 5 discusses efficiency of equilibrium protocols and shows that
asymptotic efficiency can be obtained when agents become infinitely patient
or the benefit/cost ratio increases without bound. However, the protocols
we identify as asymptotically efficient are not necessarily the most efficient
protocols (for fixed population parameters). Section 6 illustrates by a sim-
ulation how big the efficiency loss from choosing the wrong protocol can be
and proves that efficiency requires a large supply of tokens. Section 7 con-
cludes and offers some directions for further research. Proofs are collected
in the Appendix.
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Other Literature
We have discussed (some of) the literature on “money as a medium of
exchange”. A somewhat different literature, on “money as memory” (see es-
pecially Kocherlakota (1998) and Wallace (2010)) studies the extent to which
the role of money can or cannot be served by record-keeping; i.e., when is
money required? In some sense, the purpose of that literature is nearly the
opposite of our purpose here. Record-keeping requires a great deal of cen-
tralization; the use of tokens makes possible complete decentralization. An
important issue for us is the welfare cost of this complete decentralization,
which is discussed in Section 6.
This work also connects to an Electrical Engineering and Computer
Science literature that discusses token exchanges in online communities.
Some of that literature assumes that agents are compliant, rather than self-
interested, and does not treat incentives and equilibrium (Vishnumurthy,
Chandrakumar & Sirer 2003), (Buttyan & Hubaux 2003); some of that lit-
erature makes use of very different models than the one offered here (Tan
& Jarvis 2006) and (Figueiredo, Shapiro & Towsley 2004); and some of the
literature is not formal and rigorous, offering simulations rather than theo-
rems (Pai & Mohr 2006). The papers closest to ours are probably Friedman,
Halpern and Kash (2006, 2007), which treat somewhat different models.
However, these papers seem puzzling in many dimensions and many of the
proofs seem mysterious (at least to us).
Another literature to which this work connects is the game-theoretic
literature on anonymous interactions. In a context in which interactions
were publicly observable, full cooperation (i.e., provision of service) could be
achieved at equilibrium by the use of trigger strategies, which deny service in
the future to any agent who refuses service in the present. As Kandori (1992)
and Ellison (2000) have pointed out, in some contexts, cooperation can be
supported even without public observability if agents deny service in the
future to all agents whenever they have observed an agent who refuses service
in the present; in this equilibrium any failure to provide service results in
a contagion, producing wider and wider ripples of defection, until no agent
provides service. However contagion is not likely to sustain cooperation in
the systems of interest to us, because the population is so large (typically
comprising tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of agents) that
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an agent is unlikely, in a reasonable time frame, to meet any other agent
whose network of past associations overlap with his. (When the population
is literally a continuum, no agent ever meets any other agent whose network
of past associations overlap with his.)
A more relevant literature, of which Kandori (1992) is again the seminal
work, uses reputation and social norms as devices as a means of incentiviz-
ing cooperation. The work that is closest to ours is Zhang, Park & van der
Schaar (2010), which asks which reputation-based systems can be supported
in equilibrium and which of these achieve the greatest social efficiency. Be-
cause provision of service in their model depends on the reputations of both
client and server, some central authority must keep track of and verify rep-
utations; hence these systems are not distributed in the sense we use here.
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2 Model
The population consists of a continuum (mass 1) of infinitely lived agents.
Each agent can provide a resource (e.g, a data file, audio file, video file,
service) that is of benefit to others but is costly to produce (uploading a
file uses bandwidth and time). The benefit of receiving this resource is b
and the cost of producing it is c; we assume b > c > 0.6 Agents care about
current and future benefits/costs and discount future benefits/costs at the
constant rate β ∈ (0, 1). Agents are risk neutral so seek to maximize the
discounted present value of a stream of benefits and costs.
Time is discrete. In each time period, a fraction ρ ≤ 1/2 of the popula-
tion is randomly chosen to be a client and matched with a randomly chosen
server ; the fraction 1− 2ρ are unmatched.7 (No agent is both a client and
a server in the same period.) When a client and server are matched, the
client chooses whether or not to request service, the server chooses whether
or not to provide service (e.g., transfer the file) if requested.
The parameters b, c, β, ρ completely describe the environment. Because
the units of benefit b and cost c are arbitrary (and tokens have no intrinsic
value), only the benefit-cost ratio r = b/c is actually relevant. We consider
variations in the benefit-cost ratio r and the discount factor β, but view the
matching rate ρ as immutable.
2.1 Tokens and Strategies
In a single interaction between a server and a client, the server has no
incentive to provide services to the client. The mechanism we study for
creating incentives to provide service involves the exchange of tokens. Tokens
are indivisible, have no intrinsic value, cannot be counterfeited, and can
be stored and transferred without loss. Each agent can hold an arbitrary
non-negative finite number of tokens, but cannot hold a negative number
6If b ≤ c there is no social value to providing service; if c ≤ 0 agents will always be
willing to provide service.
7We assume that the matching procedure is such that the Law of Large Numbers holds
exactly; Duffie & Sun (1997), Als-Ferrer (1999) and Podczek & Puzzello (forthcoming)
construct such matching procedures.
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of tokens and cannot borrow. We emphasize that our tokens are purely
electronic objects and are transferred electronically.
The designer creates incentives for the agents to provide or share re-
sources by providing a supply of tokens and recommending strategies (be-
havior) for agents when they are clients and servers. At the moment, we
allow for strategies that depend on histories but we show that optimal strate-
gies (best responses) depend only on current token holdings.
An event describes the particulars of a match at a particular time:
whether the agent was chosen to be a client or a server or neither, whether
the agent was matched with someone who was willing to serve or to buy,
whether the agent received a benefit and surrendered a token or provided
service and acquired a token or neither, and the change in the token hold-
ing. Write t for an event at time t. A history of length T specifies an initial
token holding m and a finite sequence of events h = (m; 0, 1, T−1). Write
HT for the set of histories of length T , H =
⋃
T HT for the set of finite his-
tories. An infinite history specifies an initial token holding m and an infinite
sequence of events h = (m; 0, 1, . . .). We insist that finite/infinite histories
be feasible in the sense that net token holdings are never negative (i.e., a
request for service by an agent holding 0 tokens will not be honored). Given
a finite or infinite history h, write d(h, t) for the change in token holding
at time t and d+(h, t), d−(h, t) for the positive and negative parts of d(h, t).
Note that d(h, t) = +1 if the agent serves, d(h, t) = −1 if the agent buys,
d(h, t) = 0 otherwise. Note also that the token holding at the end of the
finite history h is
N(h) = m+
T−1∑
t=0
d(h, t)
A strategy is a pair (σ, τ) : H → {0, 1}; τ is the client strategy and σ
is the server strategy. Following the history h, τ(h) = 1 means the client
requests service and τ(h) = 0 means the client does not request service;
σ(h) = 1 means the server provides service, σ(h) = 0 means the server
does not provide service. (Note that we require individual agents to follow
pure strategies, but we will eventually allow for the possibility that different
agents follow different pure strategies, so the population strategy might be
mixed.) If service is requested and provided, a single token is transferred
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from client to server, so the client’s holding of tokens decreases by 1 and the
server’s holding of tokens increases by 1. Tacitly, we assume that a token is
transferred if and only if service is provided; like the transfer of tokens itself,
this can be accomplished electronically in a completely distributed way.
2.2 Steady State Payoffs, Values and Optimal Strategies
Because we consider a continuum population, assume that agents are matched
randomly and can observe only their own histories, the relevant state of the
system from the point of view of a single agent can be completely summa-
rized by the fraction µ of agents who do not request service when they are
clients and the fraction ν of agents who do not provide service when they
are servers. If the population is in a steady state then µ, ν do not change
over time. Given µ, ν, a strategy (τ, σ) determines in the obvious way a
probability distribution P (τ, σ|µ, ν) over infinite histories H. We define the
discounted expected utility to an agent whose initial token holding is m and
who follows the strategy (τ, σ) to be
Eu(m, τ, σ|µ, ν) =
∑
h∈H
P (τ, σ|µ, ν)(h)
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
d+(h, t)b− d−(h, t)c]
(Here and below, when some of the variables β, b, c, µ, ν, τ, σ are clearly un-
derstood we frequently omit all or some of them; this should not cause
confusion.)
Given µ, ν, τ, σ and an initial token holding m we define the value to be
V (m,µ, ν, τ, σ) = sup
(τ,σ)
Eu(m, τ, σ|µ, ν)
Discounting implies that the supremum – which is taken over all strategy
profiles – exists and is at most b/(1− β).
Given µ, ν the strategy (τ, σ) is optimal or a best response for an initial
token holding of m if
Eu(m, τ, σ|µ, ν) ≥ Eu(m, τ ′, σ′|µ, ν)
for all alternative strategies τ ′, σ′. Because agents discount the future at the
constant rate β, the strategy (τ, σ) is optimal if and only it has the one-
shot deviation property ; that is, there does not exist a finite history h and
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a profitable deviation (τ ′, σ′) that differs from (τ, σ) following the history h
and nowhere else. A familiar and straightforward diagonalization argument
establishes that optimal strategies exist and achieve the value; we record
this fact below, omitting the proof.
Proposition 1 For each µ, ν and each initial token holding m there is an
optimal strategy τ, σ and
Eu(m, τ, σ|µ, ν) = V (m,µ, ν, τ, σ)
2.3 Optimal Strategies
We want to characterize optimal strategies, but before we do, there is a
degeneracy that must be addressed. If µ = 1 then no one ever requests
service so the choice of whether to provide service is irrelevant; if ν = 1 then
no one ever provides service so the choice of whether to request service is
irrelevant. In what follows, we sometimes ignore or avoid these degenerate
cases, but this should not lead to any confusion.
Fix β, b, c, µ, ν; let (τ, σ) be optimal for the initial token holding m. Note
that the continuation of (τ, σ) must also be optimal following every history
that begins with m. If h is such a history and the token holding at h is n
then (τ, σ) induces a strategy (τh, σh) from an initial token holding n that
simply transposes what follows h back to time 0, and this strategy must be
optimal for the initial token holding of n. Conversely, any strategy that is
optimal for the initial token holding of n must also be optimal following h.
It follows that optimal strategies (τ, σ) (whose existence is guaranteed by
Proposition 1) depend only on the current token holding but are otherwise
independent of history; we frequently say such strategies are Markov – but
note that they are Markov in individual token holdings. Write Σ(µ, ν, β) for
the set of optimal strategies.
Theorem 1 For all b, c, β, µ, ν with ν < 1, every optimal strategy (τ, σ) has
the property that τ(n) = 1 for every n ≥ 1; i.e. “always request service when
possible”.8
8Because a request for service will not be honored when an agent holds 0 tokens, it is
irrelevant whether τ(0) = 0 or τ(0) = 1.
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In view of Theorem 1, we suppress client strategies τ entirely, assuming
that clients always request service whenever possible. We abuse notation
and continue to write Σ(µ, ν, β) for the set of optimal strategies.
We now show that optimal (server) strategies also have a simple form.
Say that the (server) strategy σ is a threshold strategy (with threshold K) if
σ(n) = 1 if n ≤ K
σ(n) = 0 if n > K (1)
We write σK for the threshold strategy with threshold K and
Σ = {σK : 0 ≤ K <∞}
for the set of threshold strategies.
Theorem 2 For each µ, ν, b, c, β with µ < 1 the set of optimal (server)
strategies consists of either a single threshold strategy or two threshold strate-
gies with adjacent thresholds.
(The assumptions in Theorems 1 and 2 that ν < 1 and µ < 1 avoid the
degeneracies previously noted.)
2.4 Protocols
The designer chooses a per capita supply of tokens α ∈ (0,∞) and recom-
mends a strategy to each agent; we allow for the possibility that the designer
recommends different strategies to different agents. Because self-interested
agents will always play a best response, the designer will recommend only
strategies in Σ; in view of anonymity, it does not matter which agents are
recommended to play each strategy, but rather only the fraction of agents
recommended to play each strategy. Hence we can identify a recommenda-
tion with a mixed threshold strategy, which is a probability distribution on Σ;
with the obvious abuse of notation, we view γ as a function γ : N+ → [0, 1]
such that
γ(K) ≥ 0 for each K ≥ 0
∞∑
K=0
γ(K) = 1
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Write ∆(Σ) for the set of mixed threshold strategies. As usual, we identify
the threshold strategy σK with the mixed strategy that puts mass 1 on σK .
Assuming that the designer only recommends best responses (because other
recommendations would not be followed), we interpret an element γ ∈ ∆(Σ)
as a recommendation that the fraction γ(K) play the threshold strategy σK .
A protocol is a pair Π = (α, γ) consisting of a per-capita supply of tokens
α ∈ (0,∞) and a mixed strategy recommendation γ ∈ ∆(Σ).
2.5 Invariant Distributions
If the designer chooses the protocol Π = (α, γ) and agents follow the recom-
mendation γ, we can easily describe the evolution of the token distribution
(the distribution of token holdings). Note that the token distribution must
satisfy the two feasibility conditions:
∞∑
k=0
η(k) = 1 (2)
∞∑
k=0
kη(k) = α (3)
Write
µ = η(0), ν =
∑
σ(k)=0
η(k)
Evidently, µ is the fraction of agents who have no tokens, hence cannot pay
for service, and ν is the fraction of agents who do not serve (assuming they
follow the protocol).
To determine the token distribution next period, it is convenient to think
backwards and ask how an agent could come to have k tokens in the next
period. There are three possibilities; the agent could have
• k− 1 tokens in the current period, be chosen as a server, meet a client
who can pay for service, and provide service (hence acquire a token);
• k+ 1 tokens in the current period, be chosen as a client, meet a server
who provides service, and buy service (hence expend a token);
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• k tokens in the current period but and neither provide service nor buy
service (hence neither acquire nor expend a token).
Given a recommendation γ it is convenient to define σγ : N+ → [0, 1] by
σγ(n) =
∞∑
K=0
γ(K)σK(n)
Note that σγ(n) is the fraction of agents in the population who serve when
they have n tokens, assuming that agents follow the recommendation γ and
that the Law of Large Numbers holds exactly in our continuum framework,
so σγ is the population strategy. Keeping in mind that token holdings cannot
be negative, it is easy to see that the token distribution next period will be
η+(k) = η(k − 1)[ρ(1− µ)σγ(k − 1)]
+ η(k + 1)[ρ(1− ν)]
+ η(k)[1− ρ(1− µ)σγ(k)− ρ(1− ν)] (4)
where we use the convention η(−1) = 0.
Given the protocol Π = (α, γ), the (feasible) token distribution η is
invariant if η+ = η; that is, η is stationary when agents comply with the
recommendation γ. Invariant distributions always exist and are unique.
Theorem 3 For each protocol Π = (α, γ) there is a unique invariant dis-
tribution ηΠ, which is completely determined by the feasibility conditions (2)
and (3) and the recursion relationship
ηΠ(k) = ηΠ(k − 1)[ρ(1− µ)σγ(k − 1)]
+ ηΠ(k + 1)[ρ(1− ν)]
+ ηΠ(k)[1− ρ(1− µ)σγ(k)− ρ(1− ν)] (5)
2.6 Definition of Equilibrium and Robust Equilibrium
Assuming agents are rational and self-interested, they will comply with a
given protocol if and only if compliance is individually optimal; that is, no
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agent can benefit by deviating from the protocol. To formalize this, fix a
protocol Π = (α, γ), and let ηΠ be the unique invariant distribution. Write
µΠ = ηΠ(0) , νΠ =
∑
σ(k)=0
ηΠ(k)
for the fraction of agents who have no tokens and the fraction of agents who
do not serve (in the invariant distribution induced by Π), respectively. We
say Π = (α, γ) is an equilibrium protocol if σK is an optimal strategy (given
given µΠ, ηΠ) whenever γ(K) > 0. That is, γ puts positive weight only on
threshold strategies that are optimal, given the invariant distribution that
Π itself induces.
Using the one step deviation principle, we can provide a useful alterna-
tive description of equilibrium in terms of the value function V . As noted
before, because optimal strategies exist and are Markov, we may unambigu-
ously write Vk for the value following any history at which the agent has
k tokens. (The value function depends on the population data µ, ν and on
the environmental parameters b, c, β; but there should be no confusion in
suppressing those here.)
Fix any Markov strategy σ. In order for σ to be optimal, it is necessary
and sufficient that it achieves the value V` following every token holding `.
Expressed in terms of current token holdings and future values, and taking
into account how behavior in a given period affects the token holding in
the next period, this means that σ is optimal if and only if it satisfies the
following system of equations:
V0 = ρσ(0)[(1− µ)(−c+ βV1) + µβV0]
+ρ[1− σ(0)]βV0 + (1− 2ρ)βV0
Vk = ρ[(1− ν)(b+ βVk−1) + νβVk]
+ ρσ(k)[(1− µ)(−c+ βVk+1) + µβVk]
+ρ[1− σ(k)]βVk + (1− 2ρ)βVk
for each k > 0 (6)
Applying this observation to the threshold strategy σK and carrying out the
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requisite algebra, we conclude that σK is optimal if and only if
− c+ βVk+1 ≥ βVk if k ≤ K (7)
−c+ βVk+1 ≤ βVk if k > K (8)
(If it seems strange that α, γ do not appear in these inequalities, remem-
ber that the value depends on the invariant distribution ηΠ, which in turn
depends on α and on γ.)
Given a benefit/cost ratio r > 1 and a discount factor β < 1, write
EQ(r, β) for the set of protocols Π that constitute an equilibrium when
the benefit/cost ratio is r and the discount factor is β. Conversely, given
a protocol Π write E(Π) for the set {(r, β)} of pairs of benefit/cost ratios
r and discount factors β such that Π is an equilibrium protocol when the
benefit/cost ratio is r and discount factor is β. Note that EQ,E are corre-
spondences (which might have empty values) and are inverse to each other.
Given r, β we say that Π is a robust equilibrium if (r, β) belongs to the
interior of E(Π); i.e., there is some ε > 0 such that Π ∈ EQ(r′, β′) whenever
|r′−r| < ε and |β′−β| < ε. Write EQR(r, β) for the set of robust equilibrium
protocols for the benefit/cost ratio r and discount factor β and ER(Π)
for the set {(r, β)} of pairs of benefit/cost ratios for which Π is a robust
equilibrium. Note that EQR,ER are correspondences (which might have
empty values) and are inverse to each other.
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3 Equilibrium and Robust Equilibrium
We first describe the nature of equilibrium and robust equilibrium and then
use that description to show that robust equilibria exist. The crucial fact
about equilibrium is that the strategy part of an equilibrium protocol can
involve mixing over at most two (thresholds and that these thresholds must
be adjacent; the crucial fact about robust equilibrium is that the strategy
cannot involve strict mixing at all but must rather be a pure strategy.
Theorem 4 For each benefit/cost ratio r > 1 and discount factor β < 1 the
set EQ(r, β) is either empty or consists of protocols that involve only (possi-
bly degenerate) mixtures of two threshold strategies with adjacent thresholds.
Theorem 5 If Π = (α, σ) is a robust equilibrium then σ is a pure threshold
strategy.
The existence of equilibrium or robust equilibrium does not seem at all
obvious (and our proof is not simple). For both intuition and technical
convenience, it is convenient to work “backwards”: rather than beginning
with population parameters r, β and looking for protocols Π that constitute
an equilibrium for those parameters, we begin with a protocol Π and look
for population parameters r, β for which Π constitutes an equilibrium. That
is, we do not study the correspondences EQ(r, β) and EQR(r, β) directly,
but rather the inverse correspondences E(Π) and ER(Π). (This is easier for
several reasons, one of which is that the latter correspondences are always
non-empty.)
To give an intuitive understanding of the difficulty and how we overcome
it, fix a protocol Π = (α, σ) and let ηΠ be the invariant distribution. Because
we will eventually want to find a robust equilibrium, we assume σ is a
threshold strategy: σ = σK . To look for population parameters r, β for
which Π is an equilibrium, let us fix r and let β vary. (Alternatively, we
could fix β and let r vary, or vary both β, r simultaneously, but the intuition
is most easily conveyed by fixing r and letting β vary.) As we have already
noted, the invariant distribution ηΠ, and hence µΠ, νΠ, depends only on Π.
If β is close to 0, an agent will have little incentive to acquire tokens, but
18
the incentive to acquire tokens increases as β → 1. It can be shown that
there is a smallest discount factor βL(Π) with the property that an agent
whose discount factor is at least βL(Π) will be willing to continue providing
service until he has acquired K tokens. This is not enough, because σK will
only be incentive compatible if the agent is also willing to stop providing
service after he has acquired K tokens. However, it can also be shown that
there is a largest discount factor βH(Π) for which the agent is willing to
stop providing service after he has acquired K tokens, and that βL(Π) <
βH(Π). (Recall that r,Π are fixed.) For every discount factor β in the
closed interval [βL(Π), βH(Π)], the protocol Π is an equilibrium when the
population parameters are r, β; that is, (r, β) ∈ E(Π). From this it can
be shown that for every discount factor β in the interval (βL(Π), βH(Π)),
the protocol Π is a robust equilibrium when the population parameters are
r, β; that is, (r, β) ∈ ER(Π). Similarly, we can hold β fixed and let r
vary from 1 to∞, construct the corresponding intervals [rL(Π), rH(Π)] with
rL(Π) < rH(Π) and then show that for every benefit/cost ratio r in the
open interval (rL(Π), rH(Π)) the protocol Π is a robust equilibrium when
the population parameters are r, β; that is, (r, β) ∈ ER(Π). This is the
content of Theorem 6 below.
Applying this procedure for every protocol yields a family {ER(Π)} of
non-empty open sets of parameters r, β for which robust equilibria exist.
However our work is not done; we would also like to know that {ER(Π)}
covers a big enough set of population parameters. For instance, we want to
know that for each r > 1 there is a β∗ < 1 such that {ER(Π)} covers the
set Π(r, β) : β > β∗}; this would mean that for each r > 1 and β > β∗ there
is a protocol Π that constitutes a robust equilibrium for these population
parameters. Proving that this is so is not at all easy, and requires deriving
some special properties of protocols of the form ΠK = (K/2, σK); this is the
content of Theorem 7 below.
It is natural to ask why our proof seems (and is) so much more compli-
cated than existence proofs in the literature, such as in Berentsen (2000).
The answer is that the literature assumes that there is an exogenous upper
limit K∗ on the number of tokens any agent can hold. As discussed above,
this assumption makes it relatively easy to show that equilibrium exists:
Fix the benefit/cost ratio fix r > 1 and an arbitrary α > 0 and consider
19
the protocol (α, σK∗). As above, an agent whose discount factor β is at
least βL(α, σK∗) will provide service until he has acquired K
∗ tokens, and
will stop providing service after he has acquired K∗ tokens because, by as-
sumption, he cannot hold more than K∗ tokens. Hence (r, β) ∈ E(α, σK∗)
for every β ≥ βL(Π) and (r, β) ∈ ER(α, σK∗) for every β > βL(α, σK∗).
As we have noted in the Introduction, assuming an exogenous upper bound
on token holdings does not seem realistic in the environments we consider.
However, even if a large exogenous upper bound K∗ were imposed, our ap-
proach would yield much more, because we can construct robust equilibria
for discount factors much smaller than βL(α, σK∗).
Theorem 6 Fix a protocol Π = (α, σK).
(i) For each benefit/cost ratio r > 1, the set {β : Π ∈ EQ(r, β)} is a non-
degenerate closed interval [βL(Π), βH(Π)] whose endpoints are contin-
uous functions of r.
(ii) For each discount factor β < 1, the set {r : Π ∈ EQ(r, β)} is a non-
degenerate closed interval [rl(Π), rH(Π)] whose endpoints are continu-
ous functions of β.
These results are illustrated for α = 1/4 in in Figures 1 and 2. (Figure 1
may give the impression that the intervals for successive values of K do not
overlap, but as Figure 2 illustrates, they actually do overlap; the overlap is
masked by the granularity of the Figure. However, as we have already said,
we do not assert that overlapping of intervals for successive values of K is a
general property.)
For the special protocols ΠK = (K/2, σK), in which the supply of to-
kens is exactly half the selling threshold, we can say a great deal more. In
particular, the intervals corresponding to successive values of the threshold
overlap but are not nested. As suggested above, this is exactly what we
need to guarantee that equilibria exist (for sufficiently large values of the
parameters r, β).
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Theorem 7
(i) For each fixed benefit-cost ratio r > 1, successive β-intervals overlap
but are not nested:
βL(ΠK−1) < βL(ΠK) < βH(ΠK−1) < βH(ΠK)
for every threshold K. Moreover
lim
K→∞
βL(ΠK) = 1
In particular, there is some β∗ < 1 such that EQR(r, β) 6= ∅ for all
β > β∗.
(ii) For each fixed discount factor β < 1, successive r-intervals overlap but
are not nested:
rL(ΠK−1) < rL(ΠK) < rH(ΠK−1) < rH(ΠK)
for every threshold K. Moreover
lim
K→∞
rL(ΠK) =∞
In particular, there is some r∗ > 1 such that EQR(r, β) 6= ∅ for all
r > r∗.
It follows from Theorem 7 that, as K → ∞, the left-hand end-points
βL(ΠK) → 1, so a fortiori the lengths of β-intervals shrink to 0. It is
natural to guess that the lengths of these intervals shrink monotonically to
0, and simulations suggest that this guess is correct, but we have neither
a proof nor a good intuition that this is actually true. We also guess that
the lengths of r-intervals shrink monotonically, but again we have neither a
proof nor a good intuition that this is actually true.
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4 Efficiency
If agents were compliant (rather than self-interested), the designer could
simply instruct them to provide service at every meeting and they would
comply, so the per capita social gain in each period would be ρ(b − c).
If agents follow the protocol Π = (α, σK) then service will be provided
only in those meetings where the client can buy service and the server is
willing to provide service, so the per capita social gain in each period will
be ρ(b− c)(1− µΠ)(1− νΠ). Hence we define the efficiency of the protocol
Π to be
Eff(Π) = (1− µΠ)(1− νΠ)
In general it seems hard to determine the efficiency of a given protocol or
to compare the efficiency of different protocols. However, we can provide
efficiency bounds for protocols that utilize a given threshold strategy σK
and compute the precise efficiency of the protocols ΠK .
9
Theorem 8 For each α ∈ (0,∞), each threshold K and all values of the
population parameters we have:
(i) Eff(α, σK) ≤ 1− 12dαe+1
(ii) Eff(α, σK) ≤ Eff(ΠK)
(iii) Eff(ΠK) =
(
1− 1K+1
)2
=
(
K
K+1
)2
Two implications of Theorem 8 are immediate. The first is that, in order
that a (threshold) protocol achieve efficiency near 1 it is necessary that it
provide a large number of tokens and also that it prescribe a high selling
threshold. Put differently: to yield full efficiency in the limit it is not enough
to increase the number of tokens without bound or to increase the threshold
without bound – both must be increased without bound. The second is that
the protocols ΠK that provide K/2 tokens per capita are the most efficient
protocols that utilize a given threshold strategy σK .
We caution the reader, however, that the protocols ΠK need not be equi-
librium protocols, and it is (robust) equilibrium protocols that we seek.
9Berentsen (2000) derives similar results in a different model, with Poisson arrival rates.
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However, it follows immediately from Theorem 7 that whenever agents are
sufficiently patient or the benefit-cost ratio is sufficiently large (or both),
then some protocol ΠK is an equilibrium for large K, and hence that nearly
efficient equilibrium protocols always exist.
Theorem 9
(i) for each fixed discount factor β < 1
lim inf
r→∞ sup{Eff(ΠK) : ΠK ∈ EQR(β, r)} = 1
(ii) for each fixed benefit-cost ratio r > 1
lim inf
β→1
sup{Eff(ΠK) : ΠK ∈ EQR(β, r)} = 1
In words: as agents become arbitrarily patient or the benefit/cost ratio
becomes arbitrarily large, it is possible to choose robust equilibrium protocols
that achieve efficiency arbitrarily close to first best. However, as the sim-
ulation illustrated in Figure 3 demonstrates, the protocols ΠK need not be
the most efficient equilibrium protocols; in this sense, K/2 is not the optimal
quantity of money.10
Some intuition might be useful. Consider the protocols ΠK and the
corresponding invariant distributions. As K increases, the fraction of agents
who cannot purchase service and the fraction of agents who will do not
provide both decrease – so efficiency increases. However, if r, β are fixed and
K increases then the protocols ΠK will eventually cease to be equilibrium
protocols so equilibrium efficiency is bounded. On the other hand, if we fix
r and let β → 1 or fix β and let r →∞ then the thresholds K for which the
protocols ΠK are equilibrium protocols blow up, and hence efficiency tends
to 1. Put differently: high discount factors or high benefit/cost ratios make
the use of high thresholds consistent with equilibrium.
Theorem 9 provides asymptotic efficiency results; the following result
presents an explicit lower bound (in terms of the population parameters
r, β) for the efficiency obtainable by a robust equilibrium protocol.
10Contrast Berentsen (2000), for instance, in which K/2 is the optimal quantity of
money – but only under the assumption that K is an exogenous bound on token holdings.
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Theorem 10 Given the benefit/cost ratio r > 1 and the discount factor
β < 1, define11
KL = max
{
log ρβ
2(1−β)+2ρβ
(
1
1 + r
)
− 1 , 0
}
KH = log ρβ
1−β+ρβ
(
1
2r
)
Then:
(i) all the thresholds K for which ΠK is a robust equilibrium protocol lie
in the interval [KL,KH ];
(ii) the efficiency of the optimal robust equilibrium protocol is at least(
1− 1
KL+1
)2
=
(
KL
KL+1
)2
.
Theorem 10 yields a lower bound on efficiency because the optimal robust
equilibrium protocol is at least as efficient as any protocol ΠK that is a
robust equilibrium, but does not yield an upper bound on efficiency because
the optimal robust equilibrium protocol might be more efficient than any
protocol ΠK that is a robust equilibrium.
Theorem 10 also yields the designer an effective procedure for finding a
robust equilibrium whose efficiency is good, if not optimal, since all that is
necessary is to check protocols ΠK with thresholds K in the (finite) interval
[KL,KH ]. Moreover, it is not necessary to conduct an exhaustive search.
Rather the designer can begin by checking the protocol ΠK , where K is the
midpoint of the interval [KL,KH ]. If MσK (K − 1) ≥ c/β and MσK (K) ≤
c/β, then ΠK is an equilibrium protocol and the search can stop. IfMσK (K−
1) < c/β, then for all K ′ > K, MσK′ (K
′ − 1) < c/β (because βL(ΠK′) >
βL(ΠK)). Therefore threshold protocols for which K
′ > K cannot be an
equilibrium and the designer can restrict search to the left half interval
[KL,K]. If MσK (K) > c/β, then for all K
′ < K, MσK′ (K
′) > c/β (because
βH(ΠK′) > β
H(ΠK)). Therefore threshold protocols for which K
′ < K
cannot be an equilibrium and the designer can restrict search to the right
half interval [K,KH ]. Continuing to bisect in this way, the designer can find
an equilibrium threshold protocol in at most log2(K
H −KL) iterations.
11Note that both the basis of the logarithms and the arguments are less than 1.
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(red (thick) - Π3; blue (thin) - optimal equilibrium protocols)
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5 Choosing the Right Protocol
The reader may wonder why we have put so much emphasis on choosing the
right protocol. As Figure 3 already shows, the reason is simple: choosing
the wrong protocol can result in an enormous efficiency loss. Figure 4,
which compares efficiency of the most efficient protocol with efficiency of a
protocol for which the strategic threshold is constrained to be K = 3, makes
this point in an even starker way: as the reader will see, except for a small
range of discount factors, the efficiency loss is enormous.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed in some detail a simple, practicable and
distributed method to incentivize trade in on-line environments through the
use of (electronic) tokens. We have shown that when agents are patient,
the method we offer can achieve outcomes that are nearly efficient, provided
the right protocol (supply of tokens and recommended threshold) is chosen,
but that equilibrium and efficiency are both sensitive to the precise choice
of protocol. Surprisingly, the “optimal” supply of tokens need not be half
the recommended threshold; this conclusion, and others, and much of the
difficulty of our arguments are a consequence of our allowing agents to ac-
cumulate as many tokens as they wish, rather than imposing an exogenous
bound on token holdings (which is common in the literature).
Our analysis is silent about convergence to the steady state. In partic-
ular, we do not know whether the recommended strategies would lead to
convergence to the invariant distribution for all initial token distributions
or for some particular token distributions. Berentsen (2000) proves conver-
gence under some conditions, but in a continuous time model in which token
holdings are subject to an exogenous bound. We have already noted that
the latter is a strong (and, in our view, unrealistic) asumption, but another
point is worth making. By definition, the recommended strategy is a best
reply when the system is in the steady state, but the recommended strategy
need not be a best reply – and very likely is not a best reply – when the
system is not in the steady state – so why should agents follow it?
We have assumed that tokens are indivisible and must be exchanged
for service one-for-one. Indivisibility seems an unavoidable consequence of
the environment in which we are interested, but even if we were to allow
for exchanges of fractional tokens, an equilibrium in which fractional tokens
are exchanged cannot be robust, for the same reason that a mixed strategy
equilibrium cannot be robust: any small perturbation of the population
parameters will destroy the equilibrium. The effect of divisible money might
be achieved by allowing for random offers and acceptances, as in Berentsen,
Camera & Waller (2007), but again, equilibrium with random offers and
acceptances could not be robust.
An alternative approach would be to allow agents to offer or demand any
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integral number of tokens, depending on their own holdings.12 However, if
agents can demand multiple tokens then it would seem that no matter an
agent’s current holding, he would always be willing to serve if the price
of service was sufficiently high. Conversely, it would seem that no matter
the price of service, an agent would be willing to pay if her token holding
were sufficiently high. Hence, an equilibrium protocol in which agents could
demand multiple tokens would seem to induce a stationary distribution with
unbounded support and require offers and acceptances to depend on current
holdings. It is not clear to us that such an equilibrium protocol could exist;
certainly it would not seem to be practicable.13
We have considered the simplest setting, in which agents are identical,
all files are equally valuable, and no errors occur. In a more realistic setting,
we would need to take account of heterogeneous agents and files and allow
for the possibilities of errors (in transmission of files or exchange of tokens
or both). We have followed here the well-known adage “one has to start
somewhere” – but we are keenly aware that there is much more work to be
done.
12Much of the literature assumes that this is not possible, assuming instead that agents
who “go looking” for trade can only carry a single token, no matter their current stock of
tokens.
13Invariant distributions with unbounded support are impossible if the number of agents
is finite, no matter how large; in this case it would also seem hard to see how a model with
a continuum of agents would be a good proxy for a world with a finite, but very large,
number of agents.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1 We first estimate V (n + 1) − V (n) (for n ≥ 0)
which is the loss from having one less token. To this end fix an optimal
Markov strategy (τ, σ). We define a history-dependent strategy (τ ′, σ′) and
estimate the expected utility to an agent who begins with n tokens and fol-
lows (τ ′, σ′); this is a lower bound on V (n). The strategy (τ ′, σ′) is most
easily described in the following way: Begin by following the behavior pre-
scribed by the strategy (σ, τ) but for an agent who holds one more token
than is actually held; i.e., (τ ′, σ′)(h) = (τ, σ)(N(h) + 1). If it never hap-
pens that the agent holds 0 tokens, requests service, and is matched with
an agent who is willing to provide service, then continue in this way for-
ever. If it does happen that the agent holds 0 tokens, requests service, and
is matched with an agent who is willing to provide service, then service is
not provided in that period (because the agent cannot pay) and after that
period (τ ′, σ′) = (τ, σ). In other words, the agent behaves “as if” he held
one more token than actually held until the first time such behavior results
in requesting service, being offered service, and being unable to pay for ser-
vice; after that point, revert to (τ, σ). The point to keep in mind is that if a
moment of deviation occurs then an agent with one more token would hold
exactly 1 token, would request and receive service, and in the next period
would have 0 tokens – so that reverting to (τ, σ) is possible. Beginning with
n tokens and following the strategy (τ ′, σ′) yields the same string of payoffs
as beginning with n + 1 tokens and following the strategy (τ, σ) except in
the single period in which deviation occurs; in that period the expected loss
of utility is at most bρ. Hence the expected utility from beginning with n
tokens and following the strategy (τ ′, σ′) yields utility at least V (n+1)−bρ.
Hence V (n+ 1)−V (n) ≤ bρ < b < b/β. However, this is the incentive com-
patibility condition that guarantees that an agent strictly prefers to request
service when holding n+ 1 tokens, so the proof is complete.
At this point it is convenient to collect some notation and isolate two
technical results. Fix ρ, b, c, µ, ν and consider a Markov strategy σ. For each
k, let Vσ(k, β) be the value of following σ when the initial token holding is k
and the discount factor is β. As with the optimal value function V defined
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in the text, the value function Vσ can be defined by a recursive system of
equations:
Vσ(0, β) = ρσ(0)[(1− µ)(−c+ βVσ(1, β))
+ρ[1− σ(0)]βVσ(0, β) + (1− 2ρ)βVσ(0, β)
Vσ(k, β) = ρ[(1− ν)(b+ βVσ(k − 1, β) + νβVσ(k, β)]
+ρσ(k)[(1− µ)(−c+ βVσ(k + 1, β)) + µβVσ(k, β)]
+ρ[1− σ(k)]βVσ(k, β) + (1− 2ρ)βVσ(k, β)
for k > 0 (9)
From the value function, we define the marginal utilities
Mσ(k, β) = Vσ(k + 1, β)− Vσ(k, β) (10)
If β is fixed/understood, we simplify notation by writing Vσ(k) = Vσ(k, β)
and Mσ(k) = Mσ(k, β).
It is also convenient to introduce some auxiliary parameters:
φl = −(1− ν)ρβ
φc = 1− β + ((1− ν) + (1− µ))ρβ
φr = −(1− µ)ρβ (11)
We note the signs of these parameters and various combinations:
φl < 0 , φc > 0 , φr < 0
φl + φc + φr > 0 , φl + φc > 0 , φr + φc > 0
(12)
Using these auxiliary parameters and the recursion relations for V (σ
and performing some simple algebraic manipulations yields a useful matrix
representation involving marginals that we will use frequently:
φc φr 0 · · · 0
φl φc φr 0
...
0 φl φc φr 0
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
0 · · · 0 φl φc

K×K

Mσ(0)
Mσ(1)
...
Mσ(K1 − 1)
 =

(1− ν)ρb
0
...
0
(1− µ)ρc
 (13)
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In short form,write this matrix representation as
ΦM = u (14)
Lemma 1 Fix ρ, b, c, µ, ν and β. Let σ be a Markov strategy with the prop-
erty that
σ(k) =
{
1 if 0 ≤ k < K1
0 if K1 ≤ k < K2
Then:
(i) if 0 ≤ k < K2 then Mσ(k) > 0
(ii) in the range 0 ≤ k < K1, Mσ is either increasing, decreasing or de-
creasing then increasing
(iii) if Mσ(K1−1) ≥ c/β then Mσ(0) > Mσ(1) > ...Mσ(K1−2) ≥Mσ(K1−
1) ≥ c/β
Proof We first consider the token holding levels 0 ≤ k < K1. We make use
of the matrix representation (13).
To prove (i), we first show that Mσ(k) > 0 for 0 ≤ k < K1. If K1 < 3,
this follows by simply solving the matrix representation, so we henceforward
assume K1 ≥ 3. If there exists a token holding level k∗ with 0 ≤ k∗ < K1
such that Mσ(k
∗) ≤ 0 then one of the following must hold: either (a) there
two consecutive such token holding levels, or (b) the marginal payoffs of the
neighboring token holding levels are both positive. We consider these cases
separately.
(a) In this case, there exists k∗ such that Mσ(k∗),Mσ(k∗ + 1) are both
non-positive. Of these marginals, one is at least as big; say Mσ(k
∗) ≥
Mσ(k
∗ + 1). From the identities above we see that
Mσ(k
∗ + 2) =
φlMσ(k
∗) + φcMσ(k∗ + 1)
−φr
≤ (φl + φc)Mσ(k
∗ + 1)
−φr
≤ Mσ(k∗ + 1)
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Proceeding inductively, it follows that 0 ≥ Mσ(k∗) ≥ Mσ(k∗ + 1)... ≥
Mσ(K1 − 1). Moreover,
φcMσ(K1 − 1) = (1− µ)ρc− φlMσ(K1 − 2)
> −φlMσ(K1 − 2)
> −φlM(K − 1)
This requires φc < −φl which contradicts the sign relations (12). The
argument when Mσ(k
∗+1) ≥Mσ(k∗) is similar and is left for the reader.
(b) In this case, there exists k∗ such that Mσ(k∗ − 1) > 0, Mσ(k∗) ≤ 0,
Mσ(k
∗ + 1) > 0. This entails
φlMσ(k
∗ − 1) + φcMσ(k∗) + φrMσ(k∗ + 1) < 0 (15)
which again contradicts the sign relations (12).
From the above we conclude Mσ(k) > 0 for 0 < k < K1. To see that
Mσ(0) > 0 note that
−φrMσ(1) = φcMσ(0)− (1− ν)ρb < −φrMσ(0) (16)
Therefore, Mσ(1) < Mσ(0), so Mσ(0) > 0, as desired.
Finally, to see that Mσ(k) > 0 for K1 ≤ k < K2, apply the recursion
equations (9) to obtain
φlMσ(k − 1) + (φc + φr)Mσ(k) = 0 (17)
We know thatMσ(K1−1) > 0 so the sign relations (12) imply thatMσ(K1) >
0 as well. Now it follows inductively that Mσ(k) > 0 for K1 ≤ k < K2. This
completes the proof of (i).
To prove (ii) it is enough to show that Mσ has no local maximum for
0 < k < K1. If M had a local maximum k
∗ in this range we would have
Mσ(k
∗) ≥ Mσ(k∗ − 1) and Mσ(k∗) ≥ Mσ(k∗ + 1). However, algebraic
manipulation yields the inequalities
Mσ(k
∗) =
−φlMσ(k∗ − 1)− φrMσ(k∗ + 1)
φc
≤ −φl − φr
φc
Mσ(k
∗)
< Mσ(k
∗)
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which is a contradiction. This establishes (ii)
To prove (iii), first manipulate the matrix identity (13) to obtain:
(1− ν)ρβMσ(K1 − 2)
= (1− β + ((1− ν) + (1− µ))ρβ)Mσ(K − 1)− (1− µ)ρc
≥ (1− β + (1− ν)ρβ)Mσ(K1 − 1) ≥ (1− ν)ρβMσ(K1 − 1)
(18)
In view of (ii), the marginal payoffs are decreasing, so this establishes (iii).
Lemma 2 Fix ρ, b, c and a threshold protocol Π = (α, σK) with correspond-
ing µΠ, νΠ. The marginal utility MσK (k, β) is strictly increasing in the dis-
count factor β, i.e., if 0 ≤ β1 < β2 < 1, then,
MσK (k, β1) < MσK (k, β2) for all k (19)
Proof To economize slightly on notation we write σ = σK . We present the
proof in three steps.
In Step 1, we prove that if there exist 0 < K1 ≤ K2 < K − 1 such that
∀k ∈ [K1,K2],Mσ(k, β1) ≥ Mσ(k, β2), then at least one of the following is
true, Mσ(K1−1, β1) ≥Mσ(K1−1, β2) or Mσ(K2 +1, β1) ≥Mσ(K2 +1, β2).
In Step 2, we prove that if there exists a k∗ ∈ [0,K − 1] such that
Mσ(k
∗, β1) ≥Mσ(k∗, β2), then for all k ∈ [0,K− 1], Mσ(k, β1) ≥Mσ(k, β2).
Step 2 uses the result of Step 1.
In Step 3, we disprove the possibility that k ∈ [0,K − 1], Mσ(k, β1) ≥
Mσ(k, β2).
Step 2 and Step 3 together show a contradiction and therefore, k ∈
[0,K − 1], Mσ(k, β1) < Mσ(k, β2).
Step 1 We assert that if there are indices 0 < K1 ≤ K2 < K − 1 such
that Mσ(k, β1) ≥ Mσ(k, β2) for all K1 ≤ k ≤ K2 then at least one of the
following must hold:
(A) Mσ(K1 − 1, β1) ≥Mσ(K1 − 1, β2)
(B) or Mσ(K2 + 1, β1) ≥Mσ(K2 + 1, β2).
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To see this, note that simple manipulations of the matrix representation
(13) yield
• if K2 = K1 then
(1− ν)ρMσ(K1 − 1, β) + (1− µ)ρMσ(K2 + 1, β)
= (1/β − 1 + ((1− ν) + (1− µ))ρ)Mσ(K1, β)
• if K2 > K1 then
(1− ν)ρMσ(K1 − 1, β) + (1− µ)ρMσ(K2 + 1, β)
= (1/β − 1 + (1− µ)ρ)Mσ(K1, β)
= +(1/β − 1)[Mσ(K1 + 1, β) + ...+Mσ(K2 − 1, β)]
= +(1/β − 1 + (1− ν)ρ)Mσ(K2, β)
Since β1 < β2 and we have assumed Mσ(k, β1) ≥ Mσ(k, β2) for 0 < K1 ≤
K2 < K − 1, in each of the cases above the right-hand side is larger when
β = β1 than when β = β2. Because the terms in the left-hand sides are
positive, it follows that at least one of (A), (B) must hold, as asserted.
Step 2 We assert first that if there is a k∗, 0 ≤ k∗ ≤ K1 such that
Mσ(k
∗, β1) ≥Mσ(k∗, β2), then at least one of the following must hold:
(C) there exists some K3, 0 ≤ K3 ≤ K1, such that Mσ(k, β1) ≥Mσ(k, β2)
for all k, 0 ≤ k ≤ K3
(C) there exists some K4, 0 ≤ K4 ≤ K1, such that Mσ(k, β1) ≥Mσ(k, β2)
for all k, K4 ≤ k ≤ K−1
To see this, note first that if k∗ = 0 satisfies the hypothesis, then (C) holds
with K3 = 0 and that if k
∗ = K − 1 satisfies the hypothesis, then (D) holds
with K4 = K − 1. Hence it suffices to consider a k∗, 0 < k∗ < K − 1, that
satisfies the hypothesis. We now make use of Step 1. Set K1 = K2 = k
∗.
Applying Step 1 once increases the token holding interval where Mσ(k, β1) ≥
Mσ(k, β2) by 1. Let K1 and K2 be the new end points of the interval and
apply Step 1 again. Continuing in this way we come eventually to a point
where either K1 = 0 or K2 = K − 1. If K1 = 0, set K3 = K2 and note that
(C) holds. If K2 = K − 1, set K4 = K − 1 and note that (D) holds
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We now show that either (C) or (D) leads to the desired conclusion.
Consider (C) first. Using the matrix representation (13) we obtain
(1− ν)ρβMσ(K1 + 1, β) + (1− ν)ρb
= [1− (1− (1− µ)ρ)β]Mσ(0, β)
+ (1− β)[Mσ(1, β) + ...+M(K1 − 1, β)]
+ [1− (1− (1− ν)ρ)β]Mσ(K1, β)
The right-hand side is bigger when β = β1 than when β = β2. Therefore
Mσ(K1 + 1, β1) ≥Mσ(K1 + 1, β2). By induction, Mσ(k, β1) ≥Mσ(k, β2) for
all k, 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1.
Now consider (D). Using the matrix representation (13) we obtain
(1− µ)ρβMσ(K2 − 1, β) + (1− µ)ρc
= [1− (1− (1− ν)ρ)β]Mσ(K − 1, β)
+ (1− β)[Mσ(K − 2, β) + ...+Mσ(K2 + 1, β)]
+ [1− (1− (1− µ)ρ)β]Mσ(K2, β)
The right-hand side is bigger when β = β1 than when β = β2. Therefore
Mσ(K2− 1, β1) ≥Mσ(K2− 1, β2). By induction, Mσ(k, β1) ≥Mσ(k, β2) for
all k, 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1.
Taking (C) and (D) together completes Step 2.
Step 3 Using the matrix representation (13) we obtain
[1− (1− (1− µ)ρ)β]Mσ(0, β)
+(1− β)[Mσ(1, β) + ...+Mσ(K1 − 1, β)]
+[1− (1− (1− ν)ρ)β]Mσ(K − 1, β)
= (1− ν)ρb+ (1− µ)ρc
In view of Step 2, the left-hand side is bigger when β = β1 than when β = β2.
However, the right-hand side is independent of β, so this is a contradiction.
We conclude that Mσ(k, β1) < Mσ(k, β2) for every k, 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1.
Proof of Theorem 2 Fix β. The Markov strategy σ is optimal if and only
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if it satisfies the Bellman optimality conditions:
β(Vσ(k + 1)− Vσ(k)) ≥ c, if σ(k) = 1 (20)
β(Vσ(k + 1)− Vσ(k)) ≤ c, if σ(k) = 0 (21)
If σ is not a threshold strategy, there must exist integers K1 < K2 such that
σ(k) = 1, 0 ≤ k < K1
σ(k) = 0, K1 ≤ k < K2
σ(k) = 1, k = K2
(22)
We will show that the Bellman optimality conditions are violated at K2
and K2 − 1. To this end, let K3 be the smallest integer greater than K2
for which σ(K3) = 0. (Such an integer exists because it cannot be optimal
to serve when the token holding is sufficiently high.) Thus σ(k) = 1, for
K2 ≤ k < K3 and Mσ(K3 − 1) ≥ c/β. Following σ,
Mσ(K3 − 2) = [(1− µ)ρc− φcMσ(K3 − 1)]/φl > Mσ(K3 − 1) ≥ c/β (23)
An inductive argument shows that Mσ(K2) > Mσ(K2+1) ≥ c/β. According
to the recursion equations (9) we have
Mσ(K2 − 1) = (φcMσ(K2) + φrMσ(K2 + 1))/(−φl) > c/β
which is a contradiction. We conclude that a non-threshold strategy cannot
be optimal; equivalently, only threshold strategies can be optimal strategies.
It remains to show that the only possible optimal threshold strategies
have adjacent thresholds. Consider first two threshold strategies with con-
secutive thresholds K and K + 1. We assert that
MσK (K) < c/β ⇔MσK+1(K) < c/β (24)
We prove direction “⇒”; the “⇐” direction is similar and left to the reader.
Suppose instead that MσK+1(K) ≥ c/β. It follows that −φrMσK+1(K) ≥
(1−µ)ρc. If we delete the last line in the matrix equation (13) for σK+1 and
move MσK+1(K) to the right-hand side, we get another matrix equation
ΦK×KMσK+1 = u˜
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where u˜ = ((1−ν)ρb, 0, ..., 0,−φrMσK+1(K))T. For the thresholdK, ΦK×KMσK =
u. Therefore,
ΦK×K(MσK+1 −MσK ) = u˜− u (25)
Lemma 1 guarantees that u˜−u ≥ 0, so MσK+1 ≥MσK . That is, MσK+1(k) ≥
MσK (k) for 0 ≤ k ≤ K−1. Because MσK+1(K) ≥ c/β > MσK (K), it follows
that MσK+1(k) ≥MσK (k) for 0 ≤ k ≤ K. According to the matrix equation,
the following identity holds for both σ = σK and σ = σK+1:
(1− ν)ρb+ (1− µ)ρc
=(1− β + (1− µ)ρβ)Mσ(0)
+(1− β)
K−1∑
k=1
Mσ(k) + (1− β + (1− ν)ρβ)Mσ(K)
(26)
This is a contradiction so we have established the direction ⇒, as desired.
It follows directly from the matrix identity that
MσK (K) = c/β ⇔MσK+1(K) = c/β
Hence
MσK (K) > c/β ⇔MσK+1(K) > c/β (27)
We now assert that if K˜ > K then
MσK (K) < c/β ⇒MσK˜ (K˜ − 1) < c/β (28)
We have already shown that this is true when K˜ = K+ 1; i.e. MσK+1(K) <
c/β. Consider K˜ = K + 2. Of MσK+2(K + 1) ≥ c/β, then (27) implies
that MσK+1(K + 1) ≥ c/β. Therefore, MσK+1(K + 1) > MσK+1(K). This
is a contradiction to MσK+1(K + 1) < MσK+1(K). Following inductively we
obtain the assertion (28).
A similar argument (which we omit) shows that:
MσK (K − 1) > c/β ⇒MσK˜ (K˜) > c/β,∀K˜ < K (29)
Finally, suppose σK is an optimal threshold strategy. Then MσK (K −
1) ≥ c/β and MσK (K) ≤ c/β. If the equalities hold strictly, (28) and (29)
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guarantee that σK is the only optimal threshold strategy. If MσK (K − 1) =
c/β (and hence, MσK (K) < c/β), only σK and σK−1 are optimal threshold
strategies. If MσK (K) = c/β (and hence, MσK (K − 1) > c/β), only σK and
σK+1 are optimal threshold strategies. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3 This follows immediately from the representation of
η+ and the definition of invariance .
Proof of Theorem 4 Given a protocol Π = (α, σ), let ηΠ be the unique
invariant distribution; let µΠ be the fraction of agents who have no tokens
and νΠ the fraction of agents who do not provide service; these depend only
on Π and not on the population parameters. If σ =
∑
γ(K)σK is a best
response given the population parameters and µΠ, νΠ, γ must put strictly
positive weight only on threshold strategies σK that are pure best responses.
In view of Theorem 2, there are at most two threshold strategies that are
pure best responses and they are at adjacent thresholds. That is, σ is either
a pure threshold strategy or a mixture of two adjacent threshold strategies,
as asserted.
Proof of Theorem 5 Suppose to the contrary that Π = (α, σ) is a robust
equilibrium protocol and that σ =
∑
γ(K)σK is a proper mixed strategy,
so that γ(K) > 0 for at least two values of the threshold K, Let µΠ be the
fraction of agents who have no tokens and νΠ the fraction of agents who
do not provide service; these depend only on Π and not on the population
parameters. In view of Theorem 4, σ must assign positive probability only
to two adjacent threshold strategies; say σ = γ(K)σK + γ(K + 1)σK+1 with
γ(K) > 0 and γ(K + 1) > 0, and both σK , σK+1 must be best responses.
Because σK(K + 1) = 0 and σK+1(K + 1) = 1, equations (8), (9) (which
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality in terms of the
true value function) entail that
−c+ βVK+1 ≤ βVK
−c+ βVK+1 ≥ βVK
Hence −c+ βVK+1 = βVK . Because σK is a best response, the value func-
tions VσK must coincide with the true value function V . Hence, an agent
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following σK must be indifferent to providing service when holding K to-
kens. However, if β increases slightly MσK also increases, whence an agent
following σK must strictly prefer to provide service. In other words, when β
increases slightly, σK can no longer be a best response and σK can no longer
be an equilibrium protocol. This is a contradiction, so we conclude that
a robust equilibrium protocol Π cannot involve proper mixed strategies, as
asserted.
Proof of Theorem 6 We divide the proof of (i) into several steps.
Step 1 We first prove there exists βL ∈ [0, 1) such that
Mσ(K − 1, β) < c
β
for β < βL
Mσ(K − 1, βL) = c
β
Mσ(K − 1, β) > c
β
for β > βL
To see this, define the auxiliary function
F (β) = Mσ(K − 1, β)− c
β
F is evidently continuous. Lemma 2 guarantees that Mσ(K−1, β) is strictly
increasing in β, so F (β) is also strictly increasing in β as well. We show
that F (1) > 0 and limβ→0 F (β) < 0 and then apply the intermediate value
theorem to find βL.
To see that F (1) > 0, note first that the coefficients in the left-hand
matrix of (13) are simply φl = −ρ(1 − ν), φc = ρ(1 − ν + 1 − µ) and
φr = ρ(1− µ). We split the matrix MσK in two parts. To do this, write
u′ = (ρ(1− ν)c 0 ... 0 ρ(1− µ)c)T
u′′ = (ρ(1− ν)(b− c) 0 ... 0 0)T (30)
and define M′σK ,M
′′
σK to be the solutions to the equations
ΦM′σK = u
′, ΦM′′σK = u
′′ (31)
Note that MσK = M
′
σK
+ M′′σK and MσK is the solution to (13). It is easy
to check that M′σK is a constant matrix: M
′
σK
(k) = c for 0 ≤ k < K − 1.
46
Lemma 1 guarantees that the entries of M′′σK are strictly positive: M
′′
σ (k) >
0 for 0 ≤ k < K − 1. Hence the entries of MσK are strictly greater than c:
Mσ(k) > c for0 ≤ k < K − 1. In particular, F (1) > 0.
To see that limβ→0 F (β) < 0, suppose not. Because F is strictly increas-
ing, this means F (β) ≥ 0 for every β ∈ (0, 1], which entails that Mσ(k) ≥ cβ
for 0 ≤ k < K − 1. Summing the rows in (13) yields:
ρ(1− ν)b+ ρ(1− µ)c > K(1− β) c
β
=
Kc
β
−Kc (32)
Note that Kc/β flows up as β → 0, so this is impossible. We conclude that
limβ→0 F (β) < 0, as asserted.
Because F is strictly increasing, the intermediate value theorem guaran-
tees that we can find an unique βL such that
F (β) < 0 for β < βL
F (βL) = 0
F (β) > 0 for β > βL
The definition of F yields the desired property of βL
Step 2 Next we prove there exists βH ∈ (βL, 1) such that if β ∈ [0, βH ]
then
MσK ,β(K − 1) <
φc + φr
−φl
c
β
for β < βH
MσK ,βH (K − 1) =
φc + φr
−φl
c
β
MσK ,β(K − 1) >
φc + φr
−φl
c
β
for β > βH
To see this, note first that φc+φr−φl
c
β =
[
1− 1ρ(1−ν) + 1ρ(1−ν)β
]
c
β and define
another auxiliary function:
G(β) = MΠ(K − 1, β)− (1− 1
ρ(1− ν) +
1
ρ(1− ν)β )
c
β
G is continuous and increasing. From Step 1 it follows that MσK (K−1, 1) >
c so G(1) = MσK (K−1, 1)−c > 0. It also follows that MσK (K−1, βL) = cβL ;
because (1 − 1ρ(1−ν) + 1ρ(1−ν)βL ) cβL > 1βL , we conclude that G(βL) < 0.
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Because G is continuous and increasing, there is a unique βH ∈ (βL, 1) such
that
G(β) < 0 for β < βH
G(βH) = 0
G(β) > 0 for β > βL
Step 3 The definitions of F,G imply that in order for Π to be an equilibrium
protocol when the discount factor is β it is the necessary and sufficient
condition that F (β) ≥ 0 and G(β) ≤ 0. Hence Π is an equilibrium protocol
when the discount factor is β exactly for β ∈ [βL, βH ].
Because F,G are continuous in all their arguments and strictly increas-
ing, βL, βH , which are the zeroes of F,G, are continuous functions of the
parameters as well. This completes the proof of (i).
The proof of (ii) is similar and left to the reader.
Proof of Theorem 7 We first consider (i). Fix r. Consider the two proto-
cols ΠK = (K/2, σK) and ΠK+1 = ((K+1)/2, σK+1) and the corresponding
intervals [βL1 , β
H
1 ] and [β
L
2 , β
H
2 ] of discount factors that sustain equilibrium.
We need to show that
βL1 < β
L
2 < β
H
1 < β
H
2
(The sustainable ranges overlap between two consecutive threshold protocols
overlap but are not nested.) There are three inequalities to be established;
we carry out the analyses in (A), (B), (C) below.
There are
(A) To prove βL2 > β
L
1 , write β = β
L
1 . We show that MσK+1(K) <
c
β .
To see this, suppose not; i.e. MσK+1(K) ≥ cβ . The construction of βL1
guarantees that MσK (K−1) = c/β. We will use this inequality and equality
to show that all marginal payoffs of ΠK+1 so large that they violate the
restrictions imposed by the bounded benefit b and cost c.
To simplify the notation, let ωX =
X+1
X (
1
β − 1)1ρ . Note ωK+1 < ωK .
Then the matrix identity (13) becomes:
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
ωX + 2 −1 0 · · · 0
−1 ωX + 2 −1 0
...
0 −1 ωX + 2 −1 0
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
0 · · · 0 −1 ωX + 2

X×X

MσX (0)
MσX (1)
...
MσX (X − 1)
 =

b/β
0
...
0
c/β

(33)
Suppose MσK+1(K) ≥ MσK (K − 1) = cβ . We investigate the relation
between MσK+1(K − 1) and MσK (K − 2). Using the matrix identity,
MσK+1(K − 1)
MσK (K − 2)
=
(ωK+1 + 2)MσK+1(K)− cβ
(ωK + 2)MσK (K − 1)− cβ
>
(ωK+1 + 2)MσK+1(K)
(ωK + 2)MσK (K − 1)
>
ωK+1 + 1
ωK + 1
Moreover if 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 then
MσK+1(K − k)
MσK (K − k − 1)
=
(ωK+1 + 1)[MσK+1(K) +MσK+1(K − k + 1)]− cβ
(ωK + 1)[MσK (K − 1) +MσK (K − k)]− cβ
By induction,
MσK+1(K − k)
MσK (K − k − 1)
>
(
ωK+1 + 1
ωK + 1
)k
>
(
ωK+1
ωK
)k
>
(
1− 1
(K + 1)2
)k
> 1− k
(K + 1)2
>
K + 1
K + 2
,∀0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1
Next we prove MσK+1(0) ≥ MσK (0). This is relatively easy since, if
MσK+1(0) < MσK (0), then using the marginal payoff matrix and by in-
duction, MσK+1(K − 1) < MσK (K − 1) = cβ . This is a contradiction to
MσK+1(K − 1) > MσK+1(K) = cβ . Therefore, MσK+1(0) ≥MσK (0).
The marginal payoffs are bounded as follows,
(MσX (0) +MσX (X − 1)) + ωX
X−1∑
k=0
MσX (k) = b/β + c/β (34)
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However, since
ωK+1
K∑
k=0
MσK+1(k) >
K + 1
K
ωK+1
K∑
k=1
MσK+1(k)
>
K + 1
K
K(K + 2)
(K + 1)2
K + 1
K + 2
ωK
K−1∑
k=0
MσK (k)
= ωK
K−1∑
k=0
MσK (k)
and MσK+1(0) + MσK+1(K) > MσK (0) + MσK (K − 1), a contradiction oc-
curs. Therefore, for β = βL1 , MσK+1(K) <
c
β . This means β
L
2 > β
L
1 . This
completes (A).
(B) To prove βH2 > β
H
1 , let β = β
H
1 , we need to show that the protocol
ΠK+1 must have MσK+1(K + 1) < c/β. We use contradiction to prove
this. The idea is: Suppose MσK+1(K + 1) ≥ c/β, then we show that all
the marginal payoffs of ΠK+1 are large enough such that they violate the
restriction imposed by the bounded benefit b and cost c.
Suppose MσK+1(K + 1) ≥ MσK (K) = c/β. According to the matrix
equation, similar to part (A), by induction we can get,
MσK+1(K + 1− k)
MσK (K − k)
>
(
ωK+1 + 1
ωK + 1
)k
>
(K + 1)3
K(K + 2)2
,∀0 ≤ k ≤ K
Also MσK+1(0) ≥MσK (0). The marginal payoffs are bounded as follows,
(MσX (0) +MσX (X)) + ωX
X∑
k=0
MσX (k) = b/β + c/β (35)
However, since
ωK+1
K+1∑
k=0
MσK+1(k) >
K + 2
K + 1
ωK+1
K+1∑
k=1
MσK+1(k)
>
K + 2
K + 1
K(K + 2)
(K + 1)2
(K + 1)3
K(K + 2)2
ωK
K∑
k=0
MσK (k)
= ωK
K∑
k=0
MσK (k)
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and MσK+1(0) + MσK+1(K + 1) > MσK (0) + MσK (K), a contradiction
occurs. Therefore, for β = βH1 , MσK+1(K + 1) <
c
β . This means β
H
2 > β
H
1 .
This completes part (B).
(C) To prove βL2 < β
H
1 , wreite β = β
H
1 . We show that MσK+1(K) >
MσK (K) =
c
β . If not, then as in (A) we must have MσK+1(K) ≤MσK (K) =
c
β ; in that case we show MσK+1(k) ≤MσK (k) for 0 ≤ k ≤ K. This will again
violate the restrictions imposed by b and c.
We extend the marginal payoff matrix in (33) from K ×K to (K + 1)×
(K+ 1) and incorporate MσK (K). If MσK (K) =
c
β , such extension does not
change the solution of the marginal payoffs MσK (k), ∀k ∈ [0,K]. Note the
new coefficient matrix has the same size of the coefficient matrix for σK+1.
Suppose MσK+1(K) < MσK (K) =
c
β . According to the matrix equation,
MσK+1(K − 1)
MσK (K − 1)
=
(ωK+1 + 2)MσK+1(K)− c/β
(ωK + 2)MσK (K)− c/β
< 1
Moreover, for 0 ≤ k ≤ K we have
MσK+1(K − k)
MσK (K − k)
=
(ωK+1 + 1)[MσK+1(K) +MσK+1(K − k + 1)]− c/β
(ωK + 1)[MσK (K) +MσK (K − k + 1)]− c/β
By induction, MσK+1(k) < MσK (k) 0 ≤ k ≤ K. However, since
(MσX (0) +MσX (X − 1)) + ωX
X−1∑
k=0
MσX (k) = b/β + c/β (36)
Again, the left-hand side is bigger when X = K than when X = K + 1,
which is a contradiction. This completes part (C).
Combining (A), (B) and (C) establishes the desired string of inequalities.
The remaining conclusions of (i) follow immediately.
The argument for (ii) is very similar and left to the reader.
Proof of Theorem 8 It is convenient to first solve the following simple
maximization problem:
maximize
0≤x1,x2≤1
E∗(x1, x2) = 1− x1 − x2 + x1x2
subject to x1(1− x1)K = x2(1− x2)K
(37)
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To solve this problem, set f(x) = x(1 − x)K . A straightforward calculus
exercise shows that if 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1K+1 ≤ x2 ≤ 1 and f(x1) = f(x2) then:
(a) x1 + x2 ≥ 2K+1 , with equality achieved at x1 = x2 = 1K+1 .
(b) x1x2 ≤ 1K+1 , with equality achieved at x1 = x2 = 1K+1 .
Putting (a) and (b) together shows that the optimal solution to the maxi-
mization problem (37) is to have x1 = x2 =
1
K+1 and maxE
∗ =
(
1− 1K+1
)2
.
Now fix a protocol Π = (α, σK) and let η
Π be the corresponding invariant
distribution. If we take x1 = µ
Π, x2 = ν
Π then our characterization of the
invariant distribution shows that f(x1) = f(x2). By definition, Eff(Π) =
E∗(x1, x2) so
Eff(Π) ≤ maxE∗ =
(
1− 1
K + 1
)2
On the other hand, if α = K/2 then the invariant distribution has ηΠ(k) =
1
K+1 for all k and
Eff(K/2, σK) =
(
1− 1
K + 1
)2
= [K/(K + 1)]2
Taken together, part (ii) and (iii) are proved..
Next fix a protocol (α, σK). Let dαe be the least integer greater than or
equal to α and set K∗ = 2dαe. There are two cases to consider.
In the first case, K ≤ K∗.
Eff(α, σK) ≤
(
1− 1
K + 1
)2
≤
(
1− 1
K∗ + 1
)2
=
(
1− 1
2dαe+ 1
)2
which is the desired result in the first case.
In the second case, K > K∗. Define the protocol Π′ = (dαe, σK); let η′
be the invariant token distribution for Π′. Let Π∗ = (dαe, σK∗); note that
the invariant token distribution η∗ is uniform (η∗(k) = 1K?+1 =
1
2dαe+1 for
all k = 0, 1, ...,K∗). Note that Π′ and Π have the same strategy component
but that the token supply for Π′ is larger than for Π, and that Π′ and Π∗
have the same token supply but that the strategy component of Π′ has a
higher threshold.
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We assert that η′(0) ≥ 12dαe+1 . If not then η′(0) < 12dαe+1 = 1K?+1 . It
follows that for all k ∈ {0, 1, ...,K} we have η′(k) < 1K∗+1 = η∗(k). Hence
dα0e =
K∗∑
k=0
kη∗(k) =
K∗∑
k=0
k(η∗(k)− η′(k)) +
K∗∑
k=0
kη′(k)
≤K∗
K∗∑
k=0
(η∗(k)− η′(k)) +
K∗∑
k=0
kη′(k) = K∗(1−
K∗∑
k=0
η′(k)) +
K∗∑
k=0
kη′(k)
=K∗
K∑
k=K∗
η′(k) +
K∗∑
k=0
kη′(k) ≤
K∑
k=K∗
kη′(k) +
K∗∑
k=0
kη′(k) = dα0e
This is a contradiction. Hence, η′(0) ≥ 12dαe+1 .
Because the token supply for Π is less than Π′, the number of agents
with no tokens is larger, so η(0) > η′(0) ≥ 12dαe+1 . Hence
Eff(Π) = (1− η(0))(1− η(K)) < (1− η(0)) <
(
1− 1
2dαe+ 1
)
which is the desired result in the second case. This complete the proof for
part (i).
Proof of Theorem 9 Both assertions follow immediately by combining
Theorems 7 and 8.
Proof of Theorem 10 We first derive the lower bound KL. If ΠK =
(K/2, σK) is an equilibrium protocol then consecutive marginal utilities bear
the relationship
φlMσK (k − 1) + φcMσK (k) = −φrMσK (k + 1) > 0
(Because β is fixed, we suppress it in the notation.) Therefore, MσK (k) >
−φl
φc
MσK (k − 1). By induction,
MσK (k) >
(−φl
φc
)k
MσK (0) >
(
ρβ
2(1− β) + 2ρβ
)k
MσK (0)
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Because φcMσK (0) = (1−ν)ρb−φrMσK (1) > (1−ν)ρb+ (1−ν)ρc, we have
MσK (0) >
(1− ν)ρb
φc
=
ρβ
2(1− β) + 2ρβ
b+ c
β
Therefore,
MσK (k) >
(
ρβ
2(1− β) + 2ρβ
)k+1 b+ c
β
(38)
Because ΠK is assumed to be an equilibrium protocol, we must have
MσK (K) ≤ c/β. Moreover, we must also have(
ρβ
2(1− β) + 2ρβ
)K+1 b+ c
β
≤ c
β
because otherwise MσK (K) > c/β. Therefore,
K ≥ max{log ρβ
2(1−β)+2ρβ
c
b+ c
− 1, 0} (39)
This provides the lower bound KL.
We now derive the upper bound KH . Rewriting the relation between
consecutive marginal utilities we obtain
0 = φlMσK (k − 1) + φcMσK (k) + φrMσK (k + 1)
> φlMσK (k − 1) + (φc + φr)MσK (k)
Therefore, MσK (k) <
−φl
φc+φr
MσK (k − 1). By induction,
MσK (k) <
( −φl
φc + φr
)k
MσK (0) <
(
ρβ
1− β + ρβ
)k
MσK (0)
Because φcMσK (0) = (1−ν)ρb−φrMσK (1) < (1−ν)ρb−φrb/β = 2(1−ν)ρb,
we have,
MσK (0) <
ρβ
1− β + ρβ
2b
β
Therefore,
MσK (k) <
(
ρβ
1− β + ρβ
)k+1 2b
β
(40)
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Because ΠK is assumed to be an equilibrium protocol, we must have
MσK (K − 1) ≥ c/β. Moreover,(
ρβ
1− β + ρβ
)K 2b
β
≥ c
β
because otherwise MσK (K − 1) < c/β. Therefore,
K ≤ log ρβ
1−β+ρβ
c
2b
(41)
This provides the upper bound KH .
Combining the two estimates yields the range containing all integers K
for which ΠK is an equilibrium protocol. The estimate for efficiency follows
immediately since Eff(ΠK) ≥ Eff(ΠKL) if K ≥ KL, so the proof is com-
plete.
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